Indo US relation – the=
first
five decades (1947 -1999)
By Kaushal Vepa Ph.D
In Greek Mythology Prometheus is the God of Fire, chained =
to a
craggy rock in the Island
of Scythia.
His crime – Prometheus had shared the secret of fire with mankind, th=
ereby
giving them the means for sustenance, warmth and to provide material go=
ods
with the metals that could be forged with fire. This so angered Zeus th=
at
he had him chained to the rock. So also did the US
try to punish India=
for trying to harness the fire of the nucleus in the service of the poo=
rest
of mankind and in the defense of its people.=
PART I -US/India Bilateral relations
The relationship between the 2 largest democracies has not=
been
a happy one during the last half of the 20th century and is not going to
alter dramatically at the stroke of midnight
at the beginning of the millennium or any time shortly thereafter. But
improve these relations, the 2 nations must,=
for
there is no alternative. We are all aware by now of the reasons for this
long ranging hostility and I do not wish to go into them here. Suffice =
it
to say that a lot of these reasons have long since ceased to be valid,
among them not least the cold war.
It is also true that many of these reasons for the overt
hostility between the 2 nations still remain. There is the mutual
propensity to deliver moral judgments, although with the passing of the
Nehru era, India=
no longer indulges in this superfluous pastime. There is also a percept=
ion
that what happens in India
is not of great vital interest to America,
arguably a very superficial judgment.
One issue where the 2 countries have differed almost from =
day
one is Kashmir.
Ever since India’s disastrous experience at the UN, and it needs to be
recalled that India was the one to take the Kashmir problem to the UN,
India has been extremely chary since then of ‘Internationalizing’ t=
he
Kashmir issue and extremely suspicious of any US offers to mediate in t=
his
dispute. India
feels that countries that mediate bring in their own set of agendas, and
are less interested in solving the problems according to the merits of =
the
case. However, suspicious Indians maybe of this kind of mediation, this
does not mean that India
should stop publicizing its viewpoint in the world arena. India in fact=
has
a very strong case based on the legal accession of the state of Kashmir,
much as was the case of accession in the case of Alaska, or Texas and
certainly a stronger case than the accession of Hawaii or the accession=
of
the vast areas of Asia to Russia in the 19th century.
But what has changed dramatically is the perception that t=
he US
relationship with India’s
neighbor Pakistan
not only does not offer any tangible benefits, but is also turning out =
to
be a liability. Pakistan , it is being realized is a major exporter of =
not
only illegal opium and heroin, but a particularly virulent kind of Isla=
mic
fundamentalism that views as its goal the suppression of all cultures a=
nd
religions other than its own. India
has been particularly unfortunate in that a succession of events have
convinced the US
to use Pakistan
in a variety of roles during the last 50 years.
So what should India’s
relationship with the US
be in the new millennium ? Can 50 years of i=
rritation
and overtly hostile moves be forgotten and a new beginning be made. The answer is good relations between the 2
countries are essential not only for each other but for the whole plane=
t,
not only because the 2 represent a very large portion of humanity (Indi=
a is
the 2nd largest country and the US is the 3rd in population) but also
because this hostility has far reaching effects not only in the well be=
ing
of the subcontinent and the many nations within it, but also because of
lost opportunities to act in concert where democratic values provide a
platform for common action.
Part II – US, India,
Pakistan & Kashmir
The Kashmir
issue remains one of the thorniest issues not only between India
and Pakistan
but also between India
and the US.
We need to look at the genesis of the issue in some detail before we can
understand the reasons for the US
stance on Kashmir.
The origins of the Kashmir
issue are fairly clear. Kashmir
acceded to the Union of India and this accession was signed by Maharaja
Hari Singh of Kashmir,
whose Dogra family had ruled Kashmir
for approximately a 100 years, initially as a
general in the army of Ranjit Singh. India
then sent troops to Kashmir
to clear invaders from Pakistan
who were pillaging and looting the countryside. India
eventually took the issue to the UN hoping that the rest of Kashmir
still occupied by Pakistan
would be returned to India.
To India
this was a clear-cut case of invasion and theft of land. But to the
consternation of India
and Indians nothing of the sort happened. To understand the reasons why,
one has to go back to the Great Game that Britain
had played with Russia
for much of the previous 100 years. The great game involved preventing =
the
spread of Czarist Russian ambitions. Czarist Russia
had become the country with the largest landmass on this planet. To tra=
vel
on the Trans Siberian Railway, you had to cross 13 time zones. Clearly =
this
land and the country to which it belonged was a power to be reckoned wi=
th. Britain,
as the predominant naval and colonial power naturally took a dim view of
any potential rival. Kashmir
and Afghanistan<=
/st1:place>
were important strategic outposts for the British in preventing the
Russians from acquiring a warm water port, something that the Czars had
been trying to acquire since the time of Peter the great.
When finally Britain
was forced to relinquish control of India,
they followed the dictum of the Romans – Divide and Quit. In this cas=
e India
was divided into 2 countries India
and Pakistan.
The British from long experience immediately recognized that India
would be a major world power in the not too distant future. Why make it
easier for the Indians and certainly why let a plum like Kashmir
fall into their hands. There was also the suspicion, eventually to come
true in later years that India
would be the more difficult country to deal with because of its larger
size. In addition, Britain did not expect that India would be so
spectacularly successful in persuading all the Princely states in to
joining the Indian Union. Certainly their expectation was that <=
st1:place>Kashmir
would join Pakistan.
To their chagrin, India
finessed the whole issue thanks to Sardar Patel by accepting the instru=
ment
of accession from the Maharajah.
In the meantime the mantle for protecting the Western world
from Russia (now
the Soviet Union)
and the Communist nations would fall on the newly emergent superpower t=
he United
States. The <=
st1:country-region>US,
properly coached by Britain,
also inherited the problem of containing the power of a potentially
resurgent India=
.
Thus began a 50-year sequence of events between India
and the US,
which while not making them bitter adversaries made them highly suspici=
ous
of each other. The US
made it a point from day one to oppose India
on the Kashmir
issue. Despite periods of relative calm in the relationship, this
adversarial relationship continued pretty much undisturbed till the pre=
sent
day.
The US and Americans are disingenuous when they suggest th=
at
the reason for the deterioration of relations had to do with a number of
third party issues, such as the Non Aligned Movement etc. But this is
really a chicken and egg issue. The US
drew first blood by questioning the sovereignty of India
over Kashmir
and this was a fundamental issue of national integrity for India.
The world’s most powerful democracy was questioning the territorial
integrity of the world’s largest democracy. It took many years for In=
dians
to understand that the US
was actually hostile to the Indian conception of India
and in fact many Indians continued to blame Nehru, suggesting his woolly
headed idealism was the cause of this rift between the 2 countries. It =
did
not help matters much that India had a very free press and all the
bickering that the Indians would indulge in were there for all the worl=
d to
see.
In the early years, especially during the 50’s and 60’=
s it was
common to read articles in the western newspapers that India
was going to break up. They would contemptuously quote Indian newspapers
talking about ‘fissiparous tendencies’ and predict that India
would break up within 25 years. The 65 war was the first time that such
preconceived notions would receive a rude shock. Both the US and Britain
realized that India was not a banana republic and this was after all the
true inheritor of the British Indian army which undertook major campaig=
ns
on behalf of Britain in both world wars. While at the beginning the US
acted as a cheer leader for Pakistan
during the first few days, when it realized that the Pakistanis were lo=
sing
badly, they immediately went to the UN to stop India
from doing further damage.
Many have asked why the US
continues to support Pakistan.
After all this is the country that has had more Anti American
demonstrations than even Beijing
or even most Latin American countries. This was the country that burnt =
down
their embassy. This was a country that killed and raped embassy personn=
el,
an act that Teddy Roosevelt would surely have replied with some vigor. =
This
was a country that trained people to bomb the World trade Center in New
York. This was and is a
country exporting huge amounts of drugs to the US.
This continues to be a country that exports a virulent kind of
fundamentalist Islam that has difficulty coexisting with other cultures=
and
religions. What possible benefit could the <=
st1:place>US
derive from patronizing such a country? Americans have given all the us=
ual
answers, that Pakistan was a bulwark against communist Russia (hmm –
someone needs a reality check here), acted as a travel agent for Henry
Kissinger when he went on his trip to Beijing (an expensive travel agen=
t),
acted as a conduit for weapons to the Afghan mujahiddeen during their w=
ar
against the Soviet Union (was the result worth it?) and so on. For most
Indians these seem bizarre explanations for bizarre behavior. A democra=
tic
superpower aligning itself with a medieval theocratic state against the
worlds largest democracy for benefits of a dubious =
nature
.
One exasperated Indian has asked why the US
doesn’t declare Pakistan
to be what it blatantly is – a rogue state. The answer is that the US
is not a church and this is not a morality play. The US
does what it perceives to be in its best interests. Till now, the US
has deemed it to be, rightly or wrongly that supporting Pakistan
was in its best interest. It is my belief that this era is now coming t=
o a
close. The US is
beginning to question its half a century of investment in this country =
and
is now asking, where is the beef. The US
is not a country prone to admitting mistakes, and it certainly will nev=
er
come out and say we were wrong for 50 years. Of course very little of t=
his
change in policy had to do with anything that India
did, although many will argue that India’s
entry into the nuclear club had something to do with it. In the next
segment, we will examine what precipitated these ch=
anges
, the nuclear issue and what the future holds for US Indian
relations.
PART III
The Future of Indo/US relations
Where do the US
and India
go from here. But before we get to that , how
eager are the 2 countries to improve relations. Despite misunderstandin=
gs, there
remains a considerable amount of admiration in each of the 2 countries =
for
the other. In India=
figures like Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, Franklin Roosevelt and =
John
F Kennedy evoke considerable admiration. Even lesser known Black Americ=
ans
like George Washington Carver of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama
form part of the American folklore, known to Indians.=
On the American side there is less awareness of India,
other than as a distant country with elephants, snakes, palaces, tigers=
and
a somewhat unusual individual by the name of Gandhi. But almost every
university in the US
now has faculty from India.
Large proportions of motels and hotels in the US
are now owned by Indians. A very large proportion of the US
population has had contact with at least one physician from the Indian
subcontinent. More recently, there are increasing numbers of Indian
entrepreneurs in High Technology areas such as Silicon Valley, many of =
whom
have become wealthy using the ‘great American wealth builder’ calle=
d the IPO,
the Initial Public Offering. Every Research Lab in the US
has a fair representation of scientists and engineers from the Indian
subcontinent, and we need not mention the virtual explosion of software
engineers without whom America
could not have done the giant audit need for Y2K compliance. Indian
companies are making their appearance increasingly on American stock
exchanges and are proving to be good wealth makers for their American
investors
Despite this, the distrust between the 2 governments remai=
ns and
is particularly acute in geopolitical issues relating to the Defense and
Military. There is however considerable eagerness on both sides to impr=
ove
relations and the realization that the potential for much warmer relati=
ons
is there. The question is to how to get to that point from where we are
today.
From the Indian side there is now evident a new pragmatism=
. In
the early days there was considerable resentment that the US
always took sides with Pakistan
ever since 1947 when the US
voted against India=
in the UN Security council resolutions on Kashmir.
But now India realizes, that it is unrealistic to expect the US
to abandon its long standing ally, even though it has not been a democr=
acy
for most of its life. India
wants to build a relationship with the US
quite independent of Kashmir.
While this may sound difficult at first blush, recent pronouncements fr=
om
the National Security Council (John Daley) that the relationship with t=
he 2
largest countries in the subcontinent would take different trajectories=
sound
promising. By this it is assumed by the Indians that the relationship w=
ith
each of the 2 countries would be less dependent on the other. One
particularly irritating habit of the Americans of referring to both
countries in the same sentence on almost every occasion, may become a
casualty of this new approach (we hesitate to call it a doctrine yet) m=
uch
to the relief of the Indians. Despite the recent developments in Pakistan
leading to military rule, I remain optimistic that the distance between=
the
US and
India
on this question is not as far as it appears on first blush.=
The proper approach as far as <=
st1:place>America
is concerned is to stop looking at India
through the narrow prism of subcontinental South Asian politics and as =
the
20th century inheritor of the British Raj . =
India
has to be recognized for what she is, the 2nd largest country in the wo=
rld,
the 5th largest economy with a diverse and
arguably versatile industrial base. Militarily India
is no slouch either , although I would cauti=
on
Americans from being beguiled into thinking that India
will somehow be a military superpower much like China
and therefore that would be reason enough to improve relations. The fac=
t of
the matter is , that it will be many decades=
, if
ever that India=
can be regarded as a military superpower and it would be misleading to =
use
that as the excuse for improving relations. Far better to leverage on t=
he
immense purchasing power of the Indian populace, probably the largest in
the world and build up strong commercial ties that will be more endurin=
g.
A word needs to be said here on the larger question of the
different perspectives each country has on global security in general a=
nd
non-proliferation (NP) in particular. For the US NP means Nuclear Weapo=
ns
should be restricted to the P5. In enunciating such a doctrine, the US
basically does not answer the question uppermost in the mind of Indians.
How should India=
find security when sandwiched between 2 hostile pow=
ers ?
Most in the American foreign policy establishment brush this aside with=
a
bland statement that India’s
security concerns are not alleviated by resorting to nuclear weapons. T=
hey
never offer a positive prescription which says this is what India
should do to ensure her security. Furthermore, India’s
perception of NP, driven as it necessarily is by reasons of geography a=
nd
geopolitics, is basically that it means a world shorn of all nuclear
weapons. This is an unbridgeable gap between the 2 countries. The only =
way
this can be finessed is for the <=
span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;line-height:200%;font-family:Verdana;color:=
black'>US
to realize that India
cannot pose a threat to the US
or any of its NATO allies for several decades if ever. It must also be
accepted by the US that India has no ulterior designs on US allies such=
as
Australia, and does not covet the real estate there as a safety valve f=
or
its own population.
To conclude, it is evident that the picture that emerges is
hardly crystal clear in terms of where the relationship is going between
the 2 countries. If that were the case, either India
or the US
would have been close allies or bitter enemies. Alas, reality intrudes =
as
always and simplicity is the first victim. The surprise really is the
extent of the hostility between the two given that neither country has =
ever
attacked the other or spilt the blood of the other or has burnt down a
consulate or an embassy or has colonized the other. I predict realism w=
ill
dawn on the policy makers of both countries and with the right touch of=
pragmatism, there is every reason to hope for brig=
hter
days ahead for the checkered US/India courtship.
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